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1.  Introduction 
 
Recently there has been a growing interest in developing countries in the use of direct cash transfers 
targeted at poor households as an important component of a more comprehensive poverty alleviation 
strategy.
1  In Coady and Harris (2001), in the context of Mexico’s PROGRESA program, we 
emphasize the need to account for the indirect general equilibrium impacts of such transfers when 
evaluating their overall welfare impact.  However, there we focus exclusively on the aggregate welfare 
impact of the program and the role of the “cost of public funds” as a sufficient statistic in capturing 
indirect general equilibrium welfare effects.  In this paper we focus exclusively on the spatial distribution 
of the aggregate welfare impact by exploiting the regional disaggregation of the underlying computable 
general equilibrium model.   
 
The welfare impact of such transfers can be expected to vary substantially across regions both because 
poverty (and thus the level of cash transfers) varies spatially but also because the indirect general 
equilibrium welfare effects can vary spatially.  The former reflects program design features, while the 
nature of the latter depends on such things as nature of consumption and production patterns across 
households and regions, the structure of factor and commodity markets and the mechanisms through 
which equilibrium is restored in these markets, and the ways in which the program is financed.  
Information on the likely differential regional welfare impacts is important for a number of reasons.  For 
                                                 
1 Mexico and Honduras introduced such a program with national coverage in 1997 and 2000 respectively.  Nicaragua 
introduced a similar program at a pilot level in 2000.  Other countries in Latin America (e.g. Columbia, Argentina and 





example, the regional distribution of the welfare impacts is potentially important from a political 
economy perspective in generating political support for the program.  Similarly, because of differential 
regional impacts, the distribution of poverty after the program may differ from that before the program 
and such information can be extremely important for the design of other components of the poverty 
alleviation strategy. 
 
This paper extends the work of Coady and Harris (2001) to focus on the likely spatial distribution of the 
welfare impact of Mexico’s PROGRESA program.  The program targets cash transfers to poor 
households in rural areas, equivalent to approximately 30% of household income.
2  In practice, the 
program is essentially financed by the withdrawal of food subsidies, which are regarded as being very 
poorly targeted.  However, since we are particularly interested in understanding the implications of 
domestic financing of the program, we also consider alternative ways of financing the program, namely, 
alternative changes in the levels and structure of value-added taxes (VATs).  As in Coady and Harris 
(2001), the general equilibrium effects are captured using the following two-step approach.  First, the 
transfers are fed into a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model and we consider alternative ways 
of financing the program.   Then the resulting direct and indirect income effects, as well as the price 
changes, are taken from the CGE model and superimposed on disaggregated household data, in order 
to calculate the regional impacts on mean incomes, income distribution, and welfare.  
                                                 
2 In practice such transfers are made conditional on household members attending school and health clinic 







The structure of the paper is as follows.  In Section 2 we discuss the methodology used for evaluating 
the differential regional welfare (and poverty) impacts of the transfers and present a brief picture of the 
situation prior to the introduction of cash transfers.  Details of the computable general equilibrium model 
and the underlying database used to evaluate the transfers are presented in Section 3, along with a 
description of the simulations we undertake.  In Section 4 we present our results on the regional 
distribution of the welfare impact of the transfers.  Finally, section 5 summarizes and concludes. 
 
2.  The Level and Distribution of the Welfare Before the Program 
 
In this section we present a description of the spatial distribution of social welfare in Mexico prior to the 
reforms under consideration.  This will provide a reference point from which to evaluate the impact of 
the reforms on social welfare.  Our analysis uses the 1996 nationally representative household survey 
data (ENIGH96): our indicator of welfare is adult-equivalent household per capita expenditure 
(henceforth called consumption or income) denoted by y.   
 
The methodology we apply is to think of welfare (W) as being the product of the mean level of 
consumption, ì, and some measure of inequality, I, as follows: 
 
W = ì (1 - I) 
where W is increasing in mean consumption but decreasing in the index of inequality.  This formulation 





i.e., we are willing to trade-off a lower mean for a more equal distribution or vice versa.  Alternatively, 
for a given mean income, W decreases the more unequal the distribution around the mean.  For our 
measure of inequality we use the Atkinson index, which has a basis in standard welfare theory.
3   
 
We group households into five regions: (1) North, (2) Central, (3) South West, (4) South East, and (5) 
Urban.  The distribution of all households across regions is presented in Table 1. One can see that over 
one half of the population live in the urban areas and Urban's even higher share of total income is 
consistent with a higher productivity of labor.  Urban and North have the highest mean income with 
South East having the lowest.  However, these two wealthier regions also have the most unequal 
distribution of income.  Notice also that their inequality ranking switches as we go from I(0.5) to I(1), 
consistent with income in North being especially unequally distributed at the lower end of the 
distribution.  Decomposing by region, we found that differences in mean incomes across states account 




                                                 
3 See Atkinson (1970) for details, and also Deaton (1997) for a useful discussion on this approach. The Atkinson 
index can be written as I = 1 - (ye / ì), where ye is the "equally distributed equivalent income", i.e., the amount of 
income which if distributed equally would result in the same level of social welfare as the existing distribution of 
income.  Since social welfare is decreasing in inequality (for a given distribution of income) we have ye<ì, with their 
ratio decreasing the greater our aversion to inequality (i.e., the higher å).  So ye encapsulates the concern for unequal 
distribution.  For this reason, I is often referred to as an "index of waste" since it captures the amount of social 
welfare lost through not having an equal distribution of income.  The index takes the value zero either when income is 
equally distributed (with everyone having mean income so that ye = ì) or when we are unconcerned about the 










The above pattern of mean income and inequality has the implication that our spatial ranking by welfare 
can in principle depend on our aversion to inequality.  However, in the present case, it is fairly obvious 
that the differences in means will dominate the differences in inequality levels (over plausible values of å) 
with the result that the ranking by mean income gives simultaneously the welfare rankings.  This is indeed 
borne out by our welfare index. 
 
For completeness, we also present a brief "poverty profile" for Mexico.  Although we expect this profile 
to mimic the welfare discussion above, it is useful also to have a picture of the distribution of poverty 
since later we are essentially using the poverty criterion as our "targeting rule" for determining who gets 
transfers and who does not.  In this sense, we are using the poverty analysis in a "positive" as opposed 
to a "normative" manner.  Assuming that one third of Mexicans are "poor", we identify poor households 
as those in the bottom tercile of the income distribution.  Since this may be viewed as a relatively 
generous poverty line, we describe poverty using a range of indices that capture varying degrees of 
aversion to the "severity of poverty" (Ravallion, 1993).  By construction, the national headcount index 
(i.e., the percentage of households falling below the poverty line) is 33.3%, although this can vary by 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
4 The Atkinson index is not additively decomposable.  However, the same pattern is displayed by other 
decomposable inequality measures such as the Theil index and other members of the general entropy family of 





region, and by design will be affected by the reforms to be analyzed below.  We also present the 
"poverty gap" which (unlike the headcount index) measures the depth of poverty and, if multiplied by the 
poverty line, indicates the increase in mean income required to eliminate poverty completely.  This 
should of course be interpreted as the minimum required since the elimination of poverty with this 
"budget" would also require it to be "optimally" allocated (e.g., with zero "leakage" or "under-coverage") 
and, even then, it ignores any deadweight losses (or incentive effects) associated with the policy 
instruments used to transfer income and to finance these transfers.  Finally, we also present the "severity 
index" which attaches a greater weight to households the further they are below the poverty line.
5 
 
Using this relative poverty line (which comes out at just below 657 pesos in terms of household per 
capita adult equivalent consumption), we categorize households as poor and non-poor.  The distribution 
of poor households across regions is presented in Table 2. Using the headcount ratio (i.e., the 
proportion of households classified as poor) we find that within rural areas over half of households in 
both Central and South East are classified as poor and just over 53% of the poor are found in these two 
regions.  Whereas only 18% of urban households are classified as poor, nearly 29% of the poor are 
found in urban areas.    So although a relatively high percentage of rural households are poor, there is 
still a substantial number of poor located in urban areas.  This is important since, in the reforms to be 
evaluated below, the poverty alleviation budget will be targeted only to rural areas, so that a significant 
proportion of the vulnerable population is excluded from the program. 
                                                 






The total poverty gap comes out at 76 pesos per household (or 5.3% of aggregate income) so a 5.3% 
increase in mean incomes, with the proceeds allocated optimally over only poor households, would be 
required to eliminate poverty completely.
6  This compares to the poverty alleviation budget, which 
constitutes around 2% of total income. Alternatively, the alleviation of poverty would require an optimal 
lump-sum transfer from the non-poor (who account for 90% of total income) equivalent to 5.9% of their 
income.
7  Over 81% of this gap is concentrated in rural areas, especially in the Central and South East 
regions.  The "poverty shares" of these two regions (and of South West) increase in moving from the 
poverty gap to using the severity index, suggesting that the poorest households are also located in these 
rural areas. 
 
3. The CGE Model 
 
In this section we discuss the nature of the CGE model that is used to simulate the general equilibrium 
responses to the program.
8  We start by describing the database that captures the regional differences 
within Mexico and links the various sectors of the economy together. We then discuss the structure of 
the baseline CGE model, which determines the channels through which the general equilibrium effects 
                                                 
6 These are crude measures in that household size may vary by income level.  For example, if the poor have larger 
families then these numbers would be an underestimate of the percentage poverty gap. 
7 Obviously this tax should not be collected from those sufficiently near the poverty line that payment of the tax 
would push them into poverty.  Also, in practice governments have to resort to "distortionary" tax instruments which 
would tend to require a higher tax rate (reflecting the substitution of households away from taxed activities).  These, 
and other such issues, are addressed by our analysis below.  





work.  This includes a description of the way in which factor and product markets operate and interact 
to determine how equilibrium is restored after the program is implemented.  This is followed by a 
discussion of the various policy simulations undertaken in the subsequent section, concentrating mainly 
on the nature and magnitude of the resulting sectoral and macroeconomic flows. 
 
3.1  The Database and SAM  
 
 
The CGE model used in this analysis relies on a social accounting matrix (SAM) of Mexico, based on 
1996 data.
9  The SAM accounts for all income and expenditure transactions of all sectors and 
institutions in the national economy, and thus serves as the underlying data framework for the CGE 
model.
10  The data were first collected as a national SAM, which was then divided into 5 regions.  The 
model is able to capture differences among the regions in terms of production and consumption patterns, 
in a “top-down” approach: rather than having complete regional SAMs, the model regionally 
disaggregates the national SAM only by production and factor markets as well as households. 
 
                                                 
9 The data used in constructing the SAM include: “Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de México,” INEGI, 1996, for 
national accounts data and other macro data; Informe Anual, Banco de México, 1996 for macro data; SAGAR, 1996 
for data on crop yields and land utilization; Encuesta Nacional de Ingresos y Gastos de Hogares, INEGI, 1994, for 
household income and expenditure data; GTAP database for import and export data.  The input-output coefficients 
come from a 1985 input-output table. 





The model includes four rural regions, North, Central, South West and South East, which produce 
only primary agricultural products.
11  There is one “national” urban region, which comprises all of the 
urban areas of Mexico, regardless of geographical location.  The urban area produces processed 
agricultural goods and other goods and services.  Appendix Table 1 shows which states are in each 
rural region.  Generally, the North region produces more high-valued agriculture, in particular fruits and 
vegetables, much of which is exported.  Agriculture production relies on more irrigated land use, and 
households are wealthier.  The South East region is poorest, more of the land used is non-irrigated, and 
there is less commercial farming.  The Central and South West regions are a mixture of the first two, 
with a range of subsistence and commercial farming and agricultural technology.  These two areas also 
produce the largest amounts of basic grains and beans. 
 
The SAM and CGE model permit the regionalization of agriculture.  Each rural region produces 6 
agricultural activities: maize, wheat, other grains, beans, fruits and vegetables, and other crops.  The 
model allows for multiple production activities to produce one national commodity.  For example, all 
four rural regions produce the maize activity, which is supplied to a single national maize commodity 
market.  Thus there are 24 agricultural activities but 6 agricultural commodities.  A given sector’s 
production is differentiated among the regions according to output levels and technology (in terms of 
factor and input usage).  The livestock/forestry/fishery sector is not regionalized, due to data limitations. 
                                                 
11The definition of "rural" used in this model is somewhat different from the standard.  Here we use an urban-rural 





 The urban region produces all other goods, including processed agricultural goods.  Appendix Table 2 
lists the sectors used in the model. 
 
There are 4 types of non-agricultural labor: professional, white-collar, blue-collar, and unskilled/informal 
(referred to in this paper as unskilled), and four agricultural labor categories, differentiated by region.  
The agricultural activities employ only agricultural labor and non-agricultural activities do not use any 
agricultural labor. Each rural region uses two types of land, irrigated and non-irrigated, for a total of 8 
land types. There is one capital category, used by all sectors.  
 
Each region has 3 households, defined as poor, medium or rich according to the income tercile into 
which they fall. The delineation among the categories comes from national data.  In this way, 
distributional impacts of different scenarios can be observed among income groups as well as among the 
regions.   The rural regions get labor income from all labor types, distributed according to national 
survey data. Poor rural households receive 45% of the agricultural returns to dry land in their region, 
while medium rural households receive 55% of dry land income.  All of the irrigated land payments go 
to the rich households.  The land returns (to dry land) for the livestock/forestry/fishery sector are split 
among the medium and rich rural households. Rural households also receive capital income indirectly 
through enterprises. This income is calculated as the residual between income and expenditure. Urban 
households do not receive any income from agricultural labor; the other labor categories distribute 





receive any land income and, like their rural counterparts, receive capital payments via the enterprise 
account.  
 
Household consumption patterns also come from the survey data.  Rural households have home 
consumption of the agricultural goods produced in their respective regions; all other goods are bought 
on the national market.  All households save according to parameters estimated from household survey 
data.  
    
The government and the enterprise account already alluded to are the other domestic institutions in the 
SAM. The government, which is national, collects seven types of taxes: a value-added tax, a producer 
tax, an export tax, a sales tax, an import tariff, a payroll tax and an income tax.  It receives transfers 
from the rest of the world and provides transfers to households and enterprises. The rest of the world 
account provides transfers to households, buys Mexico’s exports, and sells its imports. 
 
With the data for the SAM coming from so many disparate sources, it is not surprising that its initial 
construction was neither balanced nor consistent.  The SAM was therefore balanced using maximum 
entropy techniques to incorporate prior knowledge in a consistent way.
12  In Appendix Table 3 we 
present some useful summary statistics of the data used in the analysis. 
 
                                                 





3.2  Description of the CGE Model
13 
 
The computable general equilibrium model used in this study follows the sectoral and socio-economic 
structure of the SAM described above.  The CGE model is neo-classical in spirit, with agents 
responding to price changes.  The model is Walrasian, determining only relative prices.  Product prices, 
factor prices and the equilibrium exchange rate are defined relative to the consumer price index, which 
serves as the price numeraire.  The country is “small” in the sense that it takes world prices as given.   
 
The production technology is a nested function of constant elasticity of substitution (CES) and Leontief 
functions.  At the top level, domestic output is a linear combination of value added and intermediate 
inputs.  Value added is a CES function of the primary factors of production (the land types, labor types 
and capital mentioned above) and intermediate input demand is determined according to fixed input-
output coefficients.  The commodity output is a composite of different activities, which are imperfectly 
substitutable: thus this framework allows multiple activities to produce one commodity, as discussed in 
the SAM description.  Producers decide to supply their output to either the export or domestic market 
according to a constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function, which permits some degree of 
independence from international prices.  The composite consumption good is a CES function of 
imported and domestically produced commodities.  This aggregation, known as the Armington function, 
permits imperfect substitutability, and therefore, two-way trade, between imported and domestically 
produced goods.   
                                                 






Households receive income from factor payments (land, labor and capital payments) net of factor taxes, 
government transfers, and transfers from the rest of the world.  They consume goods according to a 
linear expenditure function (LES), purchasing goods from the market as well as from home production 
(in rural areas only).  They also pay taxes on their monetary income and save a share of their total 
income. Enterprises serve as the conduit between the capital factor account and the other institutions 
(households, government and rest of the world).  They receive capital income minus capital payments to 
the rest of the world, as well as government transfers. Enterprises transfer that payment, net of 
depreciation and taxes, to households.  Government income is the sum of all taxes: direct taxes on 
households and enterprises, value-added taxes, producer taxes, import tariffs, export taxes, social 
security taxes and sales taxes.  The government consumes commodities according to fixed shares (given 
in the SAM) and also spends money on producer subsidies, transfers to domestic institutions, and 
transfers to the rest of the world.   
 
Macro closure refers to the four macroeconomic accounts which must be balanced in the CGE model: 
the current account with the rest of the world, the government account, the savings-investment account, 
and the factor markets.  In each condition, there are variables that serve to equilibrate the equation.  The 
current account can be balanced by either the foreign savings variable or the exchange rate.  This study 
chooses the latter, so that the welfare analysis is not based on changes in foreign inflows.  The choice of 





)savings will be held fixed, as will real government spending. One of the tax instruments will be free to 
adjust to keep government savings at its base-line level.  This will allow us to perform government 
budget-neutral experiments without having government purchases of goods and services affect the 
welfare analysis.  Similarly, in the savings-investment balance, real investment will be held fixed, and the 
marginal propensity to save equilibrates the account.  In the factor market equilibria, either a factor is 
immobile and the wage can vary across sectors or the factor is free to move and the wage fixed across 
sectors.  Here, labor and land are mobile across sectors within a region, but capital is fixed.  Hence the 
model may be thought of as medium-term in nature.  
 
3.3  General Equilibrium Simulations 
 
The CGE model described above is next used to simulate the PROGRESA program. The model 
transfers income to "poor" households in rural areas, equivalent to a 30% increase in their nominal 
incomes and 2% of GDP.  The total welfare impact of such a program will depend, in part, on how it is 
financed and here we consider a number of alternatives.  The actual source of finance is the elimination 
of food subsidies.  The other alternatives considered involve various reforms of the value-added tax 






In the base-run, the government deficit is $12 billion.
14  The CGE model is programmed to keep this 
number constant.  In each simulation, the method of “closing” the budget must take into account the 
general equilibrium consequences of the transfer.  For example, although the direct cost of the 
PROGRESA program is $57 billion, it may be that increased (or decreased) tax revenues from the 
second-round effects of the transfer decrease (or increase) the amount of revenue the government needs 
in order to keep its budget constant.  The model adjusts for this through one of the equilibrating tax 
variables, specified below.   The CGE model permits the evaluation of each experiment in terms of its 
macroeconomic, sectoral and regional flows.  Proportional income and price changes are also derived 
from the CGE model, and are presented in Table 3.  Table 4 gives the resulting changes in factor prices 




In the base run of the model, subsidies on Manufactured Maize, Manufactured Wheat and Dairy 
Manufacturing imply a consumer subsidy on these goods of 25%, 20% and 20%, respectively.
15  
These subsidies cost about $58 billion, so their removal can be used to finance the PROGRESA 
transfer.  In the experiment, the income tax, which is modeled as a lump sum tax, serves as the 
equilibrating variable for the government budget and it falls slightly.  Removing the distorting subsidies 
                                                 
14 Note that we will follow the convention of using "$" to signify Mexican pesos. 
15 In 1996, the base year of the model, most consumer subsidies had already been abolished.  This model augments 
the subsidies on these three goods in an attempt to recreate the pre-reform environment and show the effects of 





causes a slight improvement in the macroeconomic accounts, with consumption increasing three-
quarters of a percent and GDP and absorption rising by one-half of one percent.   
 
At the micro level, the decreased subsidies directly lead to decreases in production of the formerly 
protected goods, and as a consequence, the output of their intermediate goods (raw Maize, Wheat and 
Livestock, in particular) also falls.  This causes resources to shift to the other agricultural goods, and in 
fact, overall agricultural output increases because resources are now allocated more efficiently.  As a 
result, there is downward pressure on most agricultural factors of production —  the exceptions are 
agricultural labor in the Central region, where the labor-intensive Beans production experiences a large 
increase in output, and irrigated land in the South East region, where Other Crops has a relatively larger 
increase in output.  The fact that most rural factors now receive lower payments explains in large part 
the decline in non-beneficiary rural household income as well as why beneficiary households end up 
receiving less than the full amount of the income transfer. 
 
The urban area's production contracts by ½ percent point as a result of the policy.  This is mainly due to 
the decrease in production of the processed foods, which were formerly protected.  Thus, all urban 
factors of production receive lower payments, which leads to a decline in urban household incomes.  









The base data have three levels of the value added tax (VAT)
16: all raw agricultural goods, processed 
agricultural goods, and food have a VAT rate of zero; the "middle" VAT rate is imposed on Light 
Manufacturing, Intermediate Goods, and Professional Services at 5%; and the "high" VAT rate is 
on Capital Goods, Consumer Durables, Construction, and Commerce, Trade and Transportation, 
equaling 10%.  The VAT is adjusted in five ways to raise the revenue needed to fund the PROGRESA 
transfer.  In the first experiment (PVAT), the VAT is raised proportionally on all goods, which causes 
the middle VAT rate to increase to 7.3% and the higher rate to increase to 14.6%.  Next, the VAT is 
increased only for those goods with the upper rate, rising to 16.1% (HVAT).  Thirdly, the VAT is 
increased and made uniform for the goods that initially had a VAT imposed on them, with the resulting 
new rate equal to 11.4% (TVAT).  Then, the VAT is increased and made uniform for the goods which 
initially had either zero VAT or the middle rate, so that these goods are now subject to a 7.2% VAT, 
while the high VAT rate remains at 10% (BVAT).  Finally, the VAT is adjusted so that it is uniform for 
all goods, including the ones which were previously exempt, for a single VAT rate of 8.3% (SVAT).  
See Table 5 for a summary of these experiments. 
 
Two of the VAT experiments slightly improve the macroeconomic indicators, namely, the uniform 
bottom rate on the zero and low VAT goods (i.e., BVAT), and the single uniform rate on all goods (i.e., 
                                                 
16 These data do not reflect actual VAT rates because they are imposed on composite production goods, the 
individual components of which may have different rates and may include exports (which are zero-rated).  Thus the 





SVAT).  The resulting VAT structures from these experiments are less distorting than the other 
experiments.  On the other hand, because these two VAT changes increase the VAT rate on agricultural 
products, agricultural factors of production suffer from lower returns.  For example, when the VAT is 
made uniform for all activities, agricultural wages fall by between 7.6% to 8.9%, and land returns fall by 
between 8.2% to 10.6%.  This then dampens the income gains to recipient households, by about 5.5% 
to 6.5% percent in either experiment.  The increase in the VAT for the sectors that originally had a low 
VAT decreases payments to the urban factors, which hurts both urban and rural household income. 
 
The other three VAT experiments, which move away from a uniform structure, are more inefficient, as 
evidenced by the slight decline in macroeconomic indicators.  However, since raw agricultural 
production and processed agriculture are not taxed, the increased demand for these products – resulting 
from the increased income to rural households – raises the agricultural wages in all three experiments.  
This does not imply that beneficiary household incomes increase beyond the transfer payment, since 
these households rely heavily on urban factor income.  The VAT lowers urban wages by more in these 
scenarios, because urban sector production is harder hit, and this negatively impacts all rural 
households, including the beneficiaries.  However, their income changes are still higher than in the two 
VAT simulations mentioned above.  And, as expected, urban households see even greater decreases in 
their income with the more distorting VAT systems, since the VAT rates are now higher for the goods 






4.  The Spatial Distribution of Welfare After the Transfers 
 
We now present the welfare results of our simulations, focusing on the differential regional impacts.  As 
in Coady and Harris (2001), we use a two-step approach: the direct transfers are fed into the CGE 
model and the resulting impacts on household incomes (i.e. through changes in factor prices) and 
commodity prices are superimposed on the household data set to generate the total impact on 
households’ real incomes, inequality of these incomes, and welfare.  The results are presented in Table 
6, but also in diagrammatic form in Figures 1a,b and 2a,b for convenience.  The first panel of results in 
the table shows the regional income, inequality and welfare situation before the transfers take place.  As 
discussed earlier, before the transfers take place, regional mean incomes vary directly with regional 
inequality.  The second panel of results presents the situation after we account for the direct impact of 
the transfers.  There we see that mean incomes increase on average by 2% but that this growth is 
distributed strongly in favor of the poorest regions.  For example, the poorest region, South East, 
exhibits an 8.8% increase in mean income.  This is as expected since the transfers are targeted at the 
poor and these regions have higher poverty rates.  The lack of any direct impact in urban areas is due to 
the concentration of the program exclusively on the rural poor.  Since the transfers were concentrated in 
the lowest income tercile, inequality also falls substantially, on average by 11% of the previous level.  





23%).  Both of these combine to produce an average increase in welfare of 12.4%, which is similarly 
biased towards the poorest regions.   
 
Focusing on the direct effect ignores the fact that the program is domestically financed.  In Coady and 
Harris (2001) we show that the indirect welfare effects associated with domestic financing arise from: 
•  A redistribution effect reflecting the fact that someone has to pay for the transfers through 
taxation; 
•  A reallocation effect reflecting the fact that those on whom the tax burden falls may have 
different propensities for spending income on taxed commodities than do those who receive 
transfers; and 
•  A distortionary effect reflecting the “deadweight loss” that arises when distortionary (as 
opposed to lump-sum) taxation is used to finance the program. 
The first effect captures the implication of the program for equity, while the latter two capture the 
implications for efficiency.  The remaining panels incorporate these indirect general equilibrium effects 
for alternative financing packages.  Panel three simulates the situation when the program is financed by 
the elimination of agriculture subsidies and represents the actual situation.  The remaining panels simulate 
hypothetical financing alternatives involving different reforms of the structure of value-added taxes 






As indicated above (Table 5) the existing VAT structure involves a “low” zero VAT on agriculture and 
processed foods, a “middle” 5% rate on light and intermediate manufacturing, and a “high” 10% rate on 
consumer durables and capital goods.  The famous Ramsey tax rule (Ramsey, 1927; Diamond and 
Mirrlees, 1971) provides the following rule of thumb for characterizing efficient tax systems: commodity 
taxes should be inversely related to own-price elasticities.  Typically, necessities such as food have low 
price elasticities and luxuries such as consumer durables have high elasticities suggesting that an efficient 
VAT system would have high taxes for food and low taxes for consumer durables.  This, of course, is 
undesirable from an equity perspective since necessities are more important in the budgets of the poor, 
thus introducing an inevitable trade-off between equity and efficiency.  Therefore, in practice one often 
observes low taxes (or even subsidies) on food and high taxes on consumer durables.  However, in 
subsistence economies with substantial consumption from home production (as opposed to from 
purchases through the market) the relevant net market trade elasticities can be quite high so that taxes 
(or subsidies) on such trade can be highly distortionary (Newbery and Stern, 1987; Coady, 1997).   
 
From the above one can characterize the removal of agricultural subsidies as the removal of highly 
distortionary price wedges.  Likewise, the increase in VAT rates on food (BVAT and SVAT) results in 
a more efficient tax system.  A proportional increase in VAT rates (PVAT) just exacerbates the 
inefficiency inherent in the existing VAT structure, while this is further exacerbated by having either a 






The third panel looks at the total effect on real incomes when the transfers are financed by the 
elimination of agricultural subsidies.  Here, average mean incomes increase by 0.8% compared to the 
pre-transfer situation, capturing the efficiency gains from eliminating distortionary agricultural subsidies.  
However, one observes very different effects across regions.  The mean incomes of the three poorest 
regions increase, while the mean incomes for the two richest regions decrease.  In aggregate, then, the 
three poorest regions receive positive net transfers while the two richest experience negative net 
transfers.  The latter is particularly pronounced in North where, although the direct transfers increase 
mean incomes by 3.5%, when the incidence of taxation is accounted for it leads to a 2.4% fall in mean 
income.  Thus the tax incidence inherent in the elimination of food subsidies falls disproportionately on 
this region.  It is also the case that allowing for program financing leads to a relatively greater decrease in 
the mean incomes in the richer regions relative to the situation without taxes and thus contributes to a 
reduction in inter-regional inequalities in rural areas.  For example, the effect of program financing is to 
reduce the effect of the transfers on mean incomes by 5.9% points in North but by only 1% point in 
South East. 
 
Inequality also falls within the poorest regions (i.e. South East, Central and South West) so that one 
observes a substantial increase in welfare in these regions of between 16.8%-22.4%.  The fact that the 
fall in inequality within these regions is lower than that observed for the direct effect in isolation indicates 
that the overall incidence of taxation is regressive in spite of the decrease in inter-regional inequality.17  
                                                 
17 For a discussion on the relationship between inequality and the progressivity-regressivity of tax systems, see 





Although mean income falls by 2.4% in North, inequality also decreases by 17.6% resulting in an 
overall increase in welfare of 11%.  The fact that inequality increases within Urban also implies that the 
incidence of taxation here is also regressive and, when combined with a fall in mean income, this leads to 
a 1.7% fall in welfare.  The smaller decreases in inequality (relative to the situation ignoring taxation) in 
the remaining rural regions indicates that the incidence of taxation is regressive and, since all these 
regions also experience increases in mean incomes, welfare also increases from between 16.8%-22.4% 
compared to the pre-program situation.  In aggregate, we observe a smaller decrease in inequality of 
9.3% (compared to 11% before taxation) indicating that nationally the incidence of taxation is 
regressive.  When combined with the 0.8% increase in mean income, this results in a 10.4% increase in 
welfare. 
 
The fourth and fifth panels present, respectively, the results when the program is financed by (i) a 
movement to a single uniform rate (SVAT), and (ii) a uniform rate in place of the low and middle rates 
(BVAT).  Both these now involve a higher tax on processed foods and light and intermediate 
manufactures, sectors located in urban areas.  But the uniform single rate also involves a lower rate for 
consumer durables and capital goods and these sectors are also located in urban areas.  The impacts on 
regional mean incomes are presented in Figure 1a, comparing these to the results that ignore program 
financing and to financing through eliminating agricultural subsidies.  The overall increase in mean 
income, although positive because of the move to a more efficient tax system, is much smaller than under 
the elimination of agricultural subsidies (i.e. 0.1% compared to 0.8%).  The effect on overall inequality 
                                                                                                                                                             





remains the same so that tax incidence is still regressive, but welfare still increases by 9.6% and 9.7% 
under both programs respectively.   
 
Although mean income in Urban experiences a larger fall, this is more than offset by a much less 
regressive tax incidence (i.e. a lower increase in inequality in Figure 1b) leading to a somewhat smaller 
decrease in welfare than under subsidy removal.  We also observe smaller increases in mean incomes in 
South West and South East consistent with these regions being more reliant on transfers from urban 
areas.  When combined with little differences in inequality reductions, this leads to a smaller increase in 
welfare than under subsidy financing.  The decrease in mean income in North is substantially smaller than 
that under subsidy reduction, but North still experiences negative net transfers.  With it experiencing a 
slight decrease in the regressivity of the tax system, which is now neutral relative to the without-taxation 
scenario, welfare increases only by slightly more than it did under subsidy reduction (11.1% compared 
to 11%).  Although Central experiences a slightly higher increase in mean income this is offset by a 
substantially smaller decrease in inequality capturing a more regressive tax incidence so that the welfare 
increase is smaller than that under subsidy reductions.   
 
The final three panels of Table 6 present the impacts when the program is instead financed by VAT 
reforms that involve increases in the middle and high rates: (i) a proportional increase where food retains 
a zero rate (PVAT), (ii) a uniform top rate that involves an increase in the middle rate but a fall in the 





mean income is negative capturing the greater inefficiency in the tax structure.  This is exacerbated by a 
slightly smaller decrease in inequality (i.e. the incidence of these tax changes is more regressive than 
those discussed above), thus leading to a lower increase in welfare.  The regional impacts are described 
in Figures 2a,b and are compared to the impact ignoring taxation and under subsidy reduction.   
 
The first thing to notice is that mean income in Urban exhibits a larger decrease at 2.4% compared to 
0.1% for the other (more efficient) VAT reforms.  This is exacerbated by a relatively large increase in 
inequality (i.e. 0.6%-1.1% compared to 0.4%) so that welfare falls by about 3% (compared to around 
1.4%).  In spite of this, we observe higher increases in mean income in South West and South East due 
to the shift away from the VAT on food that had adverse effects on agriculture and thus rural areas.  
Whereas the new tax regimes are equally regressive in South East, they are slightly more regressive in 
South West.  But their resulting increase in welfare is still higher than that under the VAT alternatives 
considered above.  There is a substantially higher increase in mean income in North, which now shifts 
from being a net contributor to the program to being a net beneficiary, reverting from around a 2% drop 
in mean income to around a 3% gain.  Not only does North now benefit from the shift away from food 
taxes (or the removal of agricultural subsidies), but it is less affected by the negative effects on the urban 
non-food sectors.  But inequality now falls by only around 12% as against around 17% under the 
alternative VAT structures, so that it exhibits only a slightly higher increase in welfare (i.e. 12% as 
against 11%).  For similar reasons, Central also experiences a substantially higher increase in mean 





incidence, so that the increase in welfare is similar to those observed under the other financing regimes. 
 So the overall bias in favor of rural mean incomes is offset by a more regressive tax system thus leading 
to a relatively small difference in relative welfare impacts. 
 
We finish by describing the distribution of poverty after the program under the subsidy removal.  In 
Table 7, we present the impact on regional changes in poverty rates and the distribution of poverty 
across regions.  Focusing on the direct impact and the headcount index, we see that the percentage of 
people who are poor decreased by 19%.  This decrease is biased towards the better-off rural regions, 
reflecting the fact that although poverty (by all measures) is lowest in these regions, their higher incomes 
mean that most of the poor are concentrated just below the poverty line.  Thus, the transfers are able to 
bring a greater proportion of the poor in these regions above this line.   
 
Our other measures of poverty – the poverty gap and the severity index -- show a similar result but less 
pronounced.  The fact that the decrease is less biased towards the richer rural regions reflects the 
smaller degree of inefficiency in the transfers in poorer regions.  In the richer regions a lot of income is 
wasted (from the perspective of poverty alleviation) in that it is more than sufficient to raise people out 
of poverty and we are now also attaching a value to pushing the poor "nearer" the poverty line rather 
than to above the poverty line, with the value increasing the greater the initial distance from the poverty 
line.18  However, this inefficiency is offset by the lower initial poverty levels in richer areas so that we 
                                                 
18 This inefficiency is not as severely "punished" using our welfare measures since income above the poverty 





still observe a bias in poverty reduction towards those areas in terms of percentage reduction.  As 
expected, with these poverty measures we also observe a more substantial percentage reduction in 
poverty, especially in the poorest rural regions. 
 
As anticipated, when the fact that the program must be financed domestically is taken into account, the 
impacts on poverty will decrease.  Overall poverty decreases by 14.7% and 33.3% according to the 
headcount and severity indices respectively, compared to 19.2% and 37% previously.  But the biggest 
changes are in North which experiences a 30.4% reduction in headcount poverty compared to 44.6% 
previously.  The fact that this difference is not as pronounced using the severity index (52.8% compared 
to 58.3% previously) suggests that those who lose from the indirect effects are concentrated around the 
poverty line.  In addition, the headcount poverty increases in Urban by 4.4% since these households do 
not receive benefits but must help to finance the program.  The increase in urban poverty is greater using 
the severity index suggesting that the poorest of the poor are worst hit.  This highlights the problems 
associated with geographically targeting rural areas and raises the important issue of horizontal equity.  It 
is clear that any comprehensive poverty alleviation strategy must incorporate urban areas.  
 
5.  Conclusions 
 
In this paper we analyze the differential regional impacts that targeted transfer programs can generate.  





transfers at poor rural households.  Our analysis makes use of the regional disaggregation of the 
underlying social accounting matrix and computable general equilibrium model.  We identify four rural 
regions (i.e. North, Central, South West, and South East) and one Urban region, which differ according 
to production and consumption patterns as well as inter-regional flows. 
 
Our analysis highlights the following features of the results: 
•  The direct impact of the transfers (i.e. before their financing is accounted for) differs regionally 
due to the initial distribution of poverty varying across regions.  The poorest regions experience 
both the largest increases in mean incomes and the largest decreases in inequality.  The large 
decreases in inequality reflect (by construction) the high distributional power of the targeted 
program. 
•  The incidence of the taxation introduced to finance the program differs substantially across 
regions and is regressive overall.  The progressive effect of program financing in terms of 
decreasing inter-regional inequality is more than offset by the regressive effect in terms of 
increasing intra-regional inequality.  Thus, the overall effect on inequality is lower than that under 
the direct effect alone.  The high distributional power inherent in the targeted nature of the 
program means that inequality decreases in all rural regions. 
•  The aggregate effect of taxation is very sensitive to the program financing strategy.  The move to 
a more efficient tax system (e.g. removing agriculture subsidies or increasing VAT on 





more inefficient alternatives (e.g. involving increasing taxes on luxuries). 
•  The regional effects of taxation are also very sensitive to the program financing strategy.  The 
more efficient tax systems have a clear bias in favor of urban areas resulting in a lower negative 
impact on urban mean income and also a less regressive tax incidence.  The less efficient tax 
systems lead to higher mean incomes in all rural areas, but especially in North and Central.  But 
the latter come at a cost in terms of a more regressive tax incidence.  The relatively smaller 
positive effect on mean incomes in South East and South West (compared to North and 
Central) under the inefficient tax systems reflects the relatively stronger negative impact of lower 
mean income in urban areas. 
•  Although the program leads to a substantial decrease in poverty at the national level, the exclusion 
of urban areas means that urban poverty increases and, after the program, accounts for a 
substantially higher proportion of total national poverty (i.e. an increase from 18% before the 
program to 30% after the program).  The increase in urban poverty is also sensitive to the 
financing strategy used, with the less (more) efficient tax system leading to a 10% (5%) increase 
in urban poverty.  This highlights the shortcomings inherent in rural targeting and raises concerns 
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Table 3—CGE Changes in Nominal Income (% from base)       
   
VAT adjustments
2   
Households  Transfer




  Poor  30    26.20  24.61  23.97  23.65  24.93  23.91 
  Medium    -4.61  -2.58  -3.08  -4.81  -2.24  -4.43 
  Rich    -8.62  -0.46  -1.72  -9.22  0.17  -7.79 
 
Central 
  Poor  30  28.15  25.64  24.70  24.24 26.08  24.65 
  Medium    -3.07  -2.55  -3.16  -4.64  -2.19  -4.25 
  Rich    -8.64  1.16  0.46  -7.04  1.5  -5.81 
 
S.West 
  Poor  30  26.62  26.16  24.98  23.03 26.66  23.73 
  Medium    -3.34  -2.87  -3.70  -5.50  -2.49  -4.96 
  Rich    -3.90  -3.79  -4.41  -6.50  -3.55  -5.99 
 
S.East 
  Poor  30  27.14  26.19  25.14  23.89 26.73  24.43 
  Medium    -2.93  -3.31  -3.96  -4.46  -2.89  -4.20 
  Rich    -1.91  -3.10  -3.97  -3.80  -2.62  -3.52 
 
Urban 
  Poor    -1.85  -4.31  -4.73  -3.52  -4.04  -3.55 
  Medium    -1.62  -3.76  -4.10  -3.08  -3.59  -3.10 
  Rich    -1.47  -3.27  -3.55  -2.55  -3.20  -2.58 
   
 
1 The program gives cash transfers to poor households in rural areas, equivalent to a 30% increase 
in nominal incomes.  Poor, medium, and rich correspond to income terciles. 
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1 See Table 5 for explanation of VAT experiments. 
2 An increase in the exchange rate is a depreciation. 




















































































a Low Rate is applied to all raw agricultural, processed agricultural and other food activities. 
b Middle Rate is applied to Light Manufacturing, Intermediate Goods, and Professional Services activities. 







Table 6—Distribution of Welfare After Rural Program Impact                 
                                





Total Effect from Subsidy  Total Effect from SVAT 
Location   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare 
North    1349  0.437  759   1396  0.373  875   1317  0.360  843   1323 0.362  844 
           (0.035)  -(0.172)  (0.152)   -(0.024)  -(0.176)  (0.11)   -(0.019) -(0.172)  (0.111) 
                                
Central    878  0.411  517   943  0.332  630   904  0.316  618   909 0.328  611 
           (0.074)  -(0.238)  (0.218)   (0.03)  -(0.231)  (0.196)   (0.035) -(0.202)  (0.181) 
                                
South West  975  0.417  568   1032  0.339  682   1001  0.337  664   990 0.336  657 
           (0.058)  -(0.23)  (0.2)   (0.027)  -(0.192)  (0.168)   (0.015) -(0.194)  (0.156) 
                                
South East  782  0.411  461   851  0.332  568   843  0.331  564   828 0.334  551 
           (0.088)  -(0.238)  (0.234)   (0.078)  -(0.195)  (0.224)   (0.059) -(0.187)  (0.197) 
                                
Urban    1868  0.462  1005   1868  0.462  1005   1861  0.469  988   1847 0.464  990 
           (0.)  (0.)  (0.)  -(0.004)  (0.015)  -(0.017)   -(0.011) (0.004)  -(0.015) 
                                
All    1429  0.506  706   1458  0.456  793   1440  0.459  779   1430 0.459  774 
           (0.02)  -(0.11)  (0.124)   (0.008)  -(0.093)  (0.104)   (0.001) -(0.093)  (0.096) 
 







             
   
Total Effect from BVAT  Total Effect from PVAT 
 
Total Effect from TVAT 
 
Total Effect from HVAT 
Location   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare   
Mean 
Income  Inequality  Welfare 
North    1315 0.356 847  1390 0.386 853  1386 0.384 854  1391 0.387  853
    -(0.025) -(0.185) (0.115)  (0.03) -(0.117) (0.124)  (0.027) -(0.121) (0.124)  (0.031) -(0.114)  (0.123)
                                 
Central    905 0.326 610  929 0.340 613  937 0.346 613  937 0.346  613
    (0.031) -(0.207) (0.18)  (0.058) -(0.173) (0.186)  (0.067) -(0.158) (0.185)  (0.067) -(0.158)  (0.185)
                                 
South West  986 0.336 655  1006 0.339 665  1005 0.34 663  1005 0.339  664
    (0.011) -(0.194) (0.152)  (0.032) -(0.187) (0.17)  (0.031) -(0.185) (0.167)  (0.031) -(0.187)  (0.169)
                                 
South East  828 0.334 551  831 0.334 553  830 0.335 552  830 0.334  553
    (0.059) -(0.187) (0.197)  (0.063) -(0.187) (0.202)  (0.061) -(0.185) (0.198)  (0.061) -(0.187)  (0.2)
                                 
Urban    1850 0.464 992  1825 0.466 975  1824 0.465 976  1823 0.467  972
    -(0.01) (0.004) -(0.013)  -(0.023) (0.009) -(0.03)  -(0.024) (0.006) -(0.029)  -(0.024) (0.011)  -(0.033)
                                 
All    1431 0.459 774  1428 0.460 771  1428 0.46 771  1427 0.461  769
    (0.001) -(0.093) (0.097)  -(0.001) -(0.091) (0.092)  -(0.001) -(0.091) (0.092)  -(0.001) -(0.089)  (0.09)
 































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 1—Rural Regions  
 
1. North 
-Baja California Norte 





































-Yucatan   










1.     Maize 
2.     Wheat 
3.     Beans 
4.     Other Grains (Sorghum, Barley) 
5.     Fruits and Vegetables 
6.       Other Crops (Tobacco, Hemp, Cotton, Cocoa, Sugar, Coffee, Soy, Safflower, 
SesameandOthers) 
7.       Livestock/Forestry/Fisheries (Bovines, Goats, Sheep, Bees, Poultry and Others, Forestry   
and Fisheries) 
8.      Dairy 
9.      Prepared Fruits and Vegetables 
10.    Wheat Manufacturing 
11.    Corn Manufacturing 
12.   Sugar Manufacturing 
13.    Other Processed Foods (Coffee Manufacturing, Processed Meats, Oils and Fats, Feeds, 
Alcohol, Beverages and Others) 
14.   Light Manufacturing (Lumber, Wood, Paper, Print, and Cigar Manufacturing,  Soft Fiber 
Textiles, Hard Fiber Textiles, Other Textiles, Leather, Apparel) 
15.   Intermediates (Chemicals, Synthetics, Rubber, Glass, Cement,Fertilizers, Other Chemicals, 
Oil Refining, Oil and Gasoline, Petrochemicals, Coal, Iron, Non-Ferrous Metal, 
Sand/Gravel, Minerals) 
16.   Consumer Items (Pharmeceuticals, Soaps, Plastic, Metal Furnishings, Household 
Appliances, Electronic Equipment, Automobiles and Parts) 
17.   Capital Goods (Metal Products, Metal Manufacturing, Non-Electronic Machines, Electronic 
Machines, Other Electric Goods, Transportation Materials, Mineral Manufacturing, Iron 
Manufacturing, Non-Ferrous Metal Manufacturing, Others) 
18.     Professional Services (Professional Services, Education, Medical, Finance/Real  Estate, 
Public Administration and Defense, Electricity, Gas and Water) 
19.   Other Services (Other Services, Restaurants 
20.  Construction 
21.   Commerce, Trade and Transportation 
 
 
1 Note that there are four activities for each of the agricultural crop sectors (sectors 1- 6): one for each 










   
 
   
 
   



























































































































   












































































































































































































































































































































































































Appendix Table 4—Equations of CGE Model 
(A listing of the sets, variables and parameters follows this table) 
 
 PRICE BLOCK 
 
(1) ( ) cm cmcm PM =   1+tm EXR  PWM ￿￿  
(2) () cecece PE=PWE1-teEXR  ￿￿  
(3) ccm cccccm (1-) = PDD + PM PQtqQQQDQM ￿￿￿￿  
(4) ( ) ccdce ccdce PX = PDS + PE QXQDQE ￿￿￿   
(5) cc PDD = PDS   
(6) ,, aacac
c
PA= PXAC q ￿ ￿  
(7) ( ) 1 aaaacac
c
PVAPAtainsubicaPQ =-+-￿ ￿   
(8) c c
c
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Appendix Table 4—continued. 
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(22) , f,a fffa
a
YF = WFWFDIST QF ￿￿ ￿  
(23) []() id,f row,f ff id,f  = YF-EXR1tf shif tr YIF ￿￿￿-  
(24) ,, id,govid,row ididfididp
id f
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Appendix Table 4—continued. 
(26) ,, idenidenenen en TRII = shii(1-SADJ)(1-TTINS)YI mps ￿￿￿￿  
(27) ,, [()()] idhidhhhh h TRII = shii1-SADJ1-TTINSYHMYHA mps ￿￿￿￿+ 
(28) , 111 ()()() hinshhhh h
ins
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PA  = PA + PQPA QAH YD gbgg ￿￿￿-￿-￿ ￿￿  
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EG = PQQGinsubQA tr + ￿￿ + ￿￿￿  
(35)  cc  = GADJ QGqg ￿  
(36)GSAV = YG-EG 
(37) cc  = IADJ QINVqinv ￿  
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SYSTEM CONSTRAINT BLOCK  
(40) c,hccc cc
h
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(42) , ins,row cmrowfce cmce
cmfceins
PWM+trPWE+FSAV QMQE tr  = + ￿￿ ￿￿￿￿  
























AAC    global set 
 
SUBSETS OF AAC 
 
a    Activities 
c    Commodities 
cm(c)    Imported Commodities 
cnm(c)   Non-imported Commodities 
ce(c)    Exported Commodities 
cne(c)    Non-exported Commodities 
f    Factors 
lab(f)    Labor Factors 
ld(f)    Land Factors 
ins    Institutions (domestic and rest of world) 
id(ins)    Domestic Institutions 
h(ins)    Households 





a a           shift parameter for CES activity production function            
ac
a a               shift parameter for domestic commodity aggregation fn           
q
c a     shift parameter for Armington function                          
t
c a        shift parameter for CET function                                
h
a,h b     LES marginal budget shares for home consumed goods (activities)    
m
c,h b     LES marginal budget shares for marketed goods (commodities)    
cwtsc        consumer price index weights                                    
a
f,a d      share parameter for CES activity production function            
ac
a,c d     share parameter for domestic commodity aggregation fn           
q
c d        share parameter for Armington function                          
t
c d        share parameter for CET function 
dwtsc        domestic sales price weights                                    
h
a,h g     LES subsistence minima for home consumed goods (activities)   
m





icac,a       intermediate input c per unit of activity a                     
mpsins          marginal propensity to save for domestic institution  
p01ins         0-1 parameter (1 for institution with variable income tax rate -0 for others)     
p04ins         0-1 parameter (1 for institution with variable VAT rate -0 for others)     
qbardstc     inventory investment by sector of origin                        
qbargc       exogenous (unscaled) government demand                          
qbarinvc     exogenous (unscaled) investment demand    
qmbarc  import quota                       
ac
c r       domestic commodity aggregation function exponent                
q
c r        Armington function exponent                                     
a
a r         CES activity production function exponent                       
t
c r         CET function exponent                                           
shifid,f      share of domestic institution id in income of factor f                   
shiiid,idp  share of domestic institution id in post-tax post-savings income of institution idp 
supernumh  LES supernumerary income 
taa    producer tax rate  
tece    export tax rate 
tff         tax per physical unit of factor f                                                    
a,c q     yield of commodity c per unit of activity a 
tinsins    direct tax rate on institution ins    
tmc         tariff rates on imports    
tm2c    premium rate on imports                                 
tqc    sales tax 
tri,aac    transfers from  institution or factor ACC to institution i               




CPI           consumer price index (PQ-based)                             
DPI           index for domestic-sales producer prices (PDS-based)        
DTINS    change in domestic institution tax share                    
DTAXADJ  direct tax scaling factor      
EG            government expenditure                                      
EXR           exchange rate                                               
FSAV         foreign savings                                             
GADJ         government demand scaling factor                            
GSAV         government savings                                          
IADJ          investment scaling factor (for fixed capital formation)     
PAa         output price of activity a                                  





PDSc        supply price for com'y c produced & sold domestically       
PEc         price of exports                                            
PMc         price of imports                                            
PQc         price of composite good c                                   
PVAa        value added price                                           
PWEce       world price of exports                                      
PWMcm   world price of imports                                      
PXc         average output price                                        
PXACa,c  price of commodity c from activity a                        
QAa         domestic activity output                                    
QDc         domestic sales                                              
QEcm         exports                                                     
QFf,a       demand for factor f from activity a                         
QFSf       factor supply                                               
QGc    government consumption                                      
QHc,h       household consumption demand                                
QINTc       intermediate demand for c                                   
QINVc       fixed investment demand                                     
QMcm         imports                                                     
QQc    composite goods supply                                                  
QXc         commodity output                                            
QXACa,c     output of commodity c from activity a                        
SADJ         savings adjustment variable  for dom. inst'ons                   
SAVINGS   total savings value                                         
TRIIi,ip    transfers to domestic institution i from domestic institution ip            
TTINSins  total direct tax on institution ins 
TVAADJ  change in activity’s VAT share 
WALRAS   savings-investment imbalance (should be zero)               
WFf         average factor price (rent)                                 
WFDISTf,a  factor market distortion variable    
YDid    expendable income                        
YFf           factor income                                               
YG            government income    
YHAh   own household consumption/income 
YHMh  marketed income                                        
YIins         income of (domestic non-governmental) institution i         
YIFins,f      income of institution i from factor f                                                                        
                   
Note: A bar over a variable indicates that the variable is exogenously fixed.  
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